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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

court, and held the fluoridation measure was a valid exercise of
Boynton's police power and was not an arbitrary or unreasonable
imposition on Quiles' constitutional rights.
The court examined the power vested in a municipality under the
Florida Constitution and found a municipality had broad
governmental, corporate, and proprietary powers to perform
municipal functions and services. Furthermore, the court found a
public authority, in a municipality, must protect the health, safety, and
general welfare of its citizens. The court said this duty included
sanitary and health regulations for the municipality's waterworks, as
evidenced by a Florida case that specifically upheld adding fluoride to
the city water supply as a valid exercise of a municipality's police
power.
Quiles asserted that the fluoridation was not within Boynton's
police power because fluoride had no real health benefits and was not
necessary to fight disease or make the water potable, but was a
prophylactic measure to fight tooth decay. Thus, Quiles claimed he
was forced to consume fluoride through Boynton's water, which
amounted to compulsory medication in violation of his right to privacy
under Article 1, Section 23 of the Florida Constitution. The court
distinguished Boynton's fluoridation measure from the prohibited
compulsory medication cases because Boynton fluoridated the water
before it entered Quiles' household and never sought to introduce
fluoride directly into Quiles' bloodstream. Thus, the court held
Boynton's fluoridation measure was not prohibited compulsory
medication because Quiles was free to choose not to ingest Boynton's
fluoridated water.
Quiles also argued that Boynton's power was limited to protecting
citizen health and did not extend to improving health by preventing
certain conditions. The court realized Quiles made a valid distinction,
but dismissed this contention saying it was not the duty of the court to
judge the wisdom of a municipality when adopting health measures.
The court's role was only to determine if Boynton acted within their
legal and constitutional limitations. Thus, the court held Boynton's
decision to fluoridate their potable water supply was within the
municipality's police power.
Kirstin E. McMillan
IDAHO
N. Snake Ground Water Dist. v. Gisler (In re SRBA Case No. 39576,
Subcase No. 36-00077D), 40 P.3d 105 (Idaho 2002) (holding
objections to decrees must be raised at the objection and response
phase of an adjudication, not in a motion to alter or amend).
The North Snake Groundwater District ("District") brought this
appeal contesting the decree of a water right to Bradley and Linda
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Gisler ("Gislers") and maintaining that it properly and timely raised
the issue before the SRBA district court. This court found that the
District did not raise its objections at the appropriate phase of the
adjudication.
The Gislers claimed a water right in July 1988 for 4.0 cfs for stock
water and irrigation for sixty-nine irrigated acres. In 1993, the Idaho
Department
of Water Resources
("IDWR")
submitted
a
recommendation for 1.5 cfs on a total of forty-eight irrigated acres.
The Gislers filed an objection to the report, however, in October 1997
the Gislers and IDWR reached an agreement and stipulated to 2.34 cfs
on sixty-one irrigated acres. The Special Master recommended a
decree in accordance with the stipulation.
In November 1997, the District filed a motion to alter or amend
the decree; this was the District's first involvement with the subcase.
The District alleged that the diversion rate in the stipulation was based
upon gravity or flood irrigation, but the Gislers were actually using
sprinkler irrigation, which allegedly requires less water. Three IDWR
affidavits supported the Districts contentions that: (1) the Gislers were
using sprinkler irrigation; (2) the decree was made on the assumption
that the Gislers would use gravity irrigation; and (3) gravity irrigation
generally requires more water than sprinkler irrigation. In 1998, the
Special Master denied the District's motion.
The District appealed to the SRBA district court and condensed
several issues into one underlying issue: IDWR's recommendation
based on gravity irrigation violated Idaho statutory mandates. The
SRBA district court denied the District's challenge, stating that
because the District had not followed proper procedure it had lost its
opportunity to object.
The District appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. The main
issue on appeal was whether the District had properly and timely filed
its objections in the SRBA district court. The District argued that a
party in the SRBA district court may challenge a special master's legal
conclusions, and, since the recommendation based on the Gislers
using a gravity system rather than a sprinkler system violated Idaho
law, this was a question of law. The District asserted that it was not
attempting to obtain an advisory opinion, rather, it was concerned that
the decree could result in non-beneficial use of water.
The Idaho Supreme Court found that an administrative order
governs the procedures of the SRBA district court and that statute
specifically states that all objections must be filed before the issuance
of a stipulation. In this case, the District filed its objections one-month
after the Gislers and IDWR reached agreement. This court held that
the District's claims were not legal in nature and the District is bound
by Idaho law; objections must be filed before issuance of a stipulation.
The District should have raised its challenges during the objection and
response period of the adjudication, not in a motion to alter or
amend.
Rebekah King

